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China’s growing technological capability has become the topic of the day
among Western officials concerned with the national security and econ-
omic competitiveness implications of China’s growing prominence. The
publication of a study which attempts to explain how security and
competitiveness have been linked in the evolution of Chinese technology
policies is therefore quite timely. The effort to locate this linkage in the
development of an ideology of techno-nationalism resonates nicely with
perceptions – held by many in Western capitals – of a China with a
special passion for the acquisition of dual use technology and a determi-
nation to use political means to secure economic advantage. The appear-
ance of Evan Feigenbaum’s book, which rightly locates China’s
technological trajectory at the centre of many of the more important
questions about the Chinese future, is thus to be welcomed.
The book is organized chronologically, beginning with a long dis-
cussion of the militarization of science and technology (S&T) in the
Maoist era. This is followed by chapters covering the early reform period,
and the new challenges faced in the 1990s. The focus throughout is on the
contribution of a group of individuals – referred to by the author as
China’s “weaponeers” – who were responsible for the development and
execution of China’s strategic weapons programmes. With Marshall Nie
Rongzhen as their guiding force, the weaponeers are said to have devel-
oped a distinctive technical community and administrative style from the
late 1950s to the late 1970s which were key to the success of those
programmes. Furthermore, argues the author, if one wants to understand
where Chinese high technology is going in the 21st century, it is impera-
tive to understand the contributions of the weaponeers to the redirection of
Chinese science and technology in the post Mao era. The book relies very
heavily – perhaps too heavily, as suggested below – on the memoirs and
official histories featuring the weaponeers which began to appear in the
1980s. The exploitation of these new primary sources provides additional
insight into the once secret world of military research and development
(R&D) during the Maoist period and is one of the strengths of the book.
One of the central puzzles about China’s Techno-Warriors, though, is
whether the insight gained from the new sources requires us to adjust our
interpretations of this secret world and its significance. We have long
known, after all, that under Mao’s leadership, the decision to build
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nuclear weapons (and subsequently programmes in missiles and nuclear
submarines) resulted in major commitments of financial resources, and
the best and brightest of China’s physical scientists and engineers, to
these programmes. China’s achievements in the strategic weapons pro-
grammes certainly were remarkable, and required the solution of many
technical, organizational and political problems. But much of this story
has already been documented by others, especially in the path-breaking
studies of John Lewis and Xue Litai. We are thus led to expect that the
original contributions of China’s Techno-Warriors will be found more in
its account of the distinctive organizational, administrative and pro-
fessional styles developed during this pre-1975 era, and the significance
of these for the post-Mao drive for high technology. These allegedly
original innovations – first, strategies for resource mobilization and the
proper uses of technical expertise, secondly, mechanisms for horizontal
co-ordination across vertically oriented bureaucracies and a flattening of
project hierarchies, and thirdly, careful benchmarking of Chinese work
against international standards (pp. 39 ff) – are said to be distinctive
contributions which help account for the “success” of the strategic
weapons programmes and serve as a model for high tech initiatives after
the mid-1980s.
Conceptually, this thesis prompts a number of questions. First, we
know that the weapons programmes faced a variety of significant chal-
lenges and changing conditions (including the Cultural Revolution) over
the period covered, and certainly did not escape disruptions. Why would
one assume, then, that coherent policy and project management styles
would emerge through all the twists and turns of politics during this
period when, plausibly, events would have challenged the consistent
implementation of a single programme management model? One won-
ders, therefore, whether the organizational and administrative achieve-
ments attributed to the weaponeers (based on sources intended, officially,
to chronicle these achievements) don’t look more effective and coherent
in retrospect than they did at the time.
Secondly, when the argument is extended to the post-Mao period, the
author seems a bit insensitive to the fact that the pursuit of clear, high
priority, weapons programmes objectives, with relatively clear authority
to command resources (characteristic of the Maoist period), is a very
different kind of institutional challenge from developing a broad-based
high technology industrial strategy in the face of many other competing
demands (the condition of the post-Mao era). Why would we assume that
the former would be a model for the latter? This second question warrants
reiteration when the long-term costs of the “successful” weapons pro-
grammes are considered. By the late 1970s, in spite of the very substan-
tial investments of the country’s scarce resources, China was still left
with a second-rate strategic weapons capability, conventional forces with
hopelessly obsolete technology and, most importantly, civilian industrial
technology which was also generally antiquated. While the author recog-
nizes this situation, he fails to ask some of the hard questions about how
and why these costs were incurred and, more importantly for the second
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half of the book, what they implied for reconstructing the S&T system in
the post-Mao era.
The conceptual questions are not put to rest by the empirical account
provided, due largely to recurring problems of contextualization in the
narrative. First, there are frustrating liberties taken with chronology in the
story. While the chapters themselves are arranged chronologically, the
discussion within individual chapters often skips back and forth through
the years with a bit too much plasticity; thus, it is sometimes difficult to
anchor the author’s claims to a clear point in time even though the timing
is often key to the accuracy of the claim. The scope of the study also
contributes to the contextualization problem. Quite broad, it encompasses
Chinese national security policy, military politics, science and technology
policy, industrial policy, and the development of Chinese techno-
nationalism, and it is not unusual to find oneself asking exactly what the
author is claiming about these different topics and what he is attempting
to explain. These various subjects all have established secondary litera-
tures but these are used rather unevenly. The resulting narrative, relying
as it does more on the memoirs and official histories, often turns out to
be long on celebrating the weaponeers but a bit incomplete in the history
it presents, and in the conceptualization of the underlying problems to be
explained.
For instance, we have long known of the significance of the strategic
weapons programmes for Chinese scientific and technological develop-
ment after the late 1950s. However, the development of policies and
programmes in civilian science and technology throughout the 1950s
must also be considered if the significance of the military story is to be
appreciated. In attempting to locate the roots of Chinese high technology
exclusively in defence policy debates and military programmes, the
author overlooks important developments in national science and technol-
ogy policies during the 1950s which involved identifying a series of then
internationally leading edge technologies for priority attention (the key
forum for this was the preparation of the 12-year S&T Plan, an important
policy undertaking which gets one sentence in the book). A look at this
planning process would indicate that China was already doing the
“benchmarking” which Feigenbaum considers to be one of the adminis-
trative achievements of the weaponeers. Research centres in the Academy
of Sciences and the industrial ministries were being established to pursue
these priority fields, universities were gearing up programmes to produce
the research personnel needed for them, and much attention was being
given to the “proper uses of technical expertise” and to “mechanisms of
horizontal co-ordination” well before the full unfolding of the strategic
programmes. However, the militarization of research associated with the
strategic weapons programmes, combined with the radical politics that
affected most scientists not protected by these programmes, led to the
attenuation of what was more clearly a broad-based science and industry
development programme, one which, arguably, would have left China in
a much better security position in the late 1970s than the strategic
programmes.
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Getting this early context right, therefore, is quite important for how
we see the unfolding of policies for high technology in the post-Mao
period. Science policy officials in the 1980s looked back on those years
and bemoaned the terrible waste of time, talent and opportunities missed
as a result of militarization and radical politics – Chinese potential for the
development of an electronics industry in 1956, for instance, was seen as
not all that much worse than Japan’s at the time. But whereas techno-
nationalism in Japan led to policies of “indigenization,” “nurturance” and
“diffusion” (Richard Samuels’ terms, cited by Feigenbaum) and to the
creation of a world-class electronics industry, the Chinese techno-
nationalism associated with the work of the weaponeers led to military
work on microelectronics being insulated from the civilian economy, thus
limiting the efforts at “nurturance” and preventing its “diffusion” to
broader societal applications. Quite plausibly, therefore, one might argue
that the industrial policy and administrative arrangements associated with
the work of the weaponeers, whose virtues Feigenbaum extols, should be
held responsible for the technological backwardness which became so
evident to Deng Xiaoping and other members of the political and
technical elites by the end of the 1970s. The weaponeers could indeed
legitimately take credit for significant achievements in the strategic
weapons programmes under difficult conditions. But, as a broad-based
approach to national technology policy, the approach of the weaponeers
could hardly be considered a success. This is precisely why science and
technology policies required the major redirection they began to receive
under Deng in 1978 and why, on the face of it, we would not expect the
strategic weapons programmes to be a model for post-Mao high technol-
ogy development.
Problems of contextualization become more serious in the author’s
post-1975 story. The latter is the part of the book which is likely to be
read by policy analysts and policy makers in today’s world capitals as
they try to decide just how large a high tech threat China is becoming. It
is therefore especially important that the context be explicated as fully as
possible.
Feigenbaum’s account of events in the post-1978 era emphasizes the
weaponeers reinventing themselves in the face of a Deng Xiaoping
programme radically to de-emphasize strategic weapons (and military
modernization more generally), even as Deng elevated the importance of
science and technology in national policy. The key to this reinvention, in
the author’s account, was the now famous 1986 initiative from four senior
scientists who had been active in the weapons programmes to start
China’s National High Technology Development Programme (or as it is
now usually referred to, the “863” Programme) by appealing to the spirit
and instrumentalities which characterized the work of the weaponeers in
the Maoist years. But, again, insensitivity to what was going on in the
wider national context of S&T policy produces a picture which is at least
incomplete and, arguably, misleading.
For instance, the author rightly notes the importance of the 1978
Conference on Science and Technology where Deng enunciated his
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vision of the importance of science and technology for post-Mao China.
But he then overlooks the consequences of this meeting – the initial
priorities coming out of the conference which were intended to be
supportive of a high tech future – and the prompt abandonment of these
priorities in the name of making “science and technology serve economic
construction.” More importantly, the daunting challenges of reconstruct-
ing the nation’s R&D system (including the weapons programmes)
following the Cultural Revolution are largely ignored by the author even
though they strongly influenced the science agenda in the early post-Con-
ference years. From this larger perspective, the issue was not so much
that the weaponeers were initially ignored by the new policies, as the
author suggests (indeed, they were being recruited into important posi-
tions, as he also recognizes), it was more that the organizational and
human resource bases for all forms of R&D needed serious attention.
This led to an initial effort to reconstitute the pre-Cultural Revolution
system, an attempt which soon gave way to the realization – paralleling
thinking about the economic system more generally – that more funda-
mental reforms in the science and technology system were needed.
The subsequent reform experience is also largely ignored by the author
in spite of its considerable importance for understanding post-Mao tech-
nology policy and high-tech development. Reform thinking in China was
strongly influenced by encounters with the outside world, as the author
acknowledges, but by focusing mainly on just one of these – the mission
led by then US Secretary of Defense William Perry (later one of
Feigenbaum’s mentors at Stanford) – the author misses the breadth and
variety of these interactions. The narrow focus on the Perry mission leads
Feigenbaum to conclude that “… strategic weaponeers were the main
point of contact with foreign administrative innovators who had them-
selves wrestled with new patterns in modes of innovation” (p.131). But,
in light of the number and range of Chinese interactions with inter-
national science and technology at the time – through multiple academic,
industrial and governmental channels – this conclusion is rather mislead-
ing; it again exalts the weaponeers at the expense of a more accurate
account of the historical situation. Quite apart from the Perry mission and
the discussions with the weaponeers during it, many members of the
Chinese technical community had contacts with many “foreign adminis-
trative innovators”; it would have been exceedingly difficult for Chinese
decision makers to miss the facts that a high technology revolution was
occurring in the capitalist world, and that China was institutionally
ill-prepared to join it without reform and new programme initiatives,
whether the Perry mission occurred or not.
Thus, by the early 1980s, Chinese research policy leaders were already
studying the organization and funding schemes of industrial, academic
and defence research found in the West which were so different from
those of China and the other centrally planned economies; this is the
context in which the initiation of the 863 Programme should be seen. As
noted above, high technology had been de-emphasized in the early 1980s,
but as China’s international exposure broadened and deepened in the
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course of the decade, the Chinese technical community began to realize
that countries around the world were giving attention and resources to
national programmes in support of certain strategic technologies (infor-
mation and communications technologies, biotechnology, robotics, mate-
rials, lasers, energy, and so on). This was true not only for the US (and
its Strategic Defense Initiative) and the other OECD countries, but also
for the Asian tigers in China’s neighbourhood as they began to plan for
their high tech futures.
Understandably, China would want to at least monitor the developmen-
tal trajectories of these technologies and ensure that a new generation of
scientists and engineers had the training to master them. This is what the
four senior scientists who first proposed the Chinese national high
technology programme were suggesting. That the proposal should come
from scientists who had been active in the weapons programmes should
not be a surprise, since virtually all high quality physical scientists and
engineers in the country who would be in a position to understand
international high technology trends had been associated with the pro-
grammes. Thus, while the origins of “863” can in this sense be linked to
the strategic weapons programme, as the author argues, when the broader
context is considered, it would be more accurate to portray its birth not
so much as an exotic effort by the weaponeers to reinvent themselves
than as a product of the times, in which multiple diverse influences –
perceptions of international trends, more intimate interactions with
MNCs, the rapid growth of Chinese students and scholars studying
abroad, increasingly ambitious domestic reforms, and so on, as well as
influences from the strategic weapons community – led to the initiation
of what was for China a number of fairly innovative approaches to the
organization and funding of research, of which 863 was one.
Curiously, after spending most of the book building a case for the
importance of national strategic technology programmes, Feigenbaum
concludes his study with the observation that we are now in an era when
the importance of targeted national R&D programmes has declined
significantly and where the key to China’s high tech future lies in market
forces, the activities of MNCs in China, and China’s new high technology
companies. While there is more than a little to be said for this conclusion,
as a number of other observers have already noted, the author’s argument
in advancing it is somewhat ad hoc. Empirically, because the broader
S&T reform context of the 1980s and 1990s is generally overlooked in
the preceding chapters, we lack an account of the institutional evolution
and experiences with foreign technology which would help justify such a
conclusion. Conceptually, the argument would have more force if as-
sumptions about the relative strengths of state directed programmes
versus market-driven approaches to innovation, about the relationships
between civilian and military technologies (involving “dual use” and
“spin on” versus “spin off” issues, for example), and about the ways in
which foreign technologies relate to indigenous technological capabilities
in a globalized world, had been clarified. By dismissing the importance
of national programmes in the final chapter after building up their
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significance in the preceding chapter, the coherence of the overall argu-
ment begins to fray. If Feigenbaum’s conclusion is accepted by today’s
policy makers, we may find them underestimating Chinese national R&D
programmes in the early years of the 21st century just as, in the 1990s,
some of them (such as the Cox Committee) tended to overestimate these
programmes as strategic elements of a Chinese technological juggernaut.
Finally, the author’s treatment of the important issue of Chinese
techno-nationalism warrants comment. Throughout, techno-nationalism
in China is treated as both guiding beacon and product of the work of the
weaponeers. Yet the book concludes, oddly, almost as an afterthought,
with some reflections on China’s experiences with technological develop-
ment during the 19th century and the Republican era. One might have
thought that a thesis on techno-nationalism should have begun with this
pre-1949 experience; most students of China’s technological develop-
ment, after all, would be inclined to seek the origins of techno-national-
ism in Chinese humiliations in the face of superior Western and Japanese
technological capabilities from these earlier periods not, in the first
instance, in the weapons programmes of the People’s Republic. While the
latter were certainly among the 20th century’s most important manifesta-
tion of techno-nationalism, as Feigenbaum convincingly argues, we
would get a more accurate picture of the play of forces in today’s
techno-nationalism by recognizing that the historical roots are deeper –
and the political, economic, and cultural implications of Chinese techno-
nationalism are far more nuanced – than the story of the weaponeers by
itself provides.
China’s Techno-Warriors is an important study reflecting a great deal
of original research in new primary materials. Too often, though, the
reach of its argument seems to exceed what the sources will sustain. A
more carefully crafted and focused discussion of the weapons pro-
grammes, and what the new sources might tell us about them, would have
been a credible project. The attempt to develop the more ambitious
argument about the origins of, and prospects for, high technology and
techno-nationalism in today’s China ultimately doesn’t work. For it to, far
more attention to the broader context of Chinese scientific and techno-
logical development, especially the complex dynamics of the S&T re-
forms and consequences of the open door policy, would be required.
There is a fairly large literature which treats these subjects which the
author might have consulted but, apparently, chose not to. The result is
an argument which, however timely, is misleading at times and, in the
end, is a less than compelling guide to the security-competitiveness
implications of China’s growing technological capabilities.
